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Nankai Business Review. 2008, (05) Core

Managerial Power, Perquisite Consumption and Perfor-mance of Property Right: Evidence from Chinese Listed CompaniesChinese Full Text

Lu Rui1, Wei Minghai1, Li Wenjing2 1. Lingnan College, Sun Yat-sen University; 2. Management School, Jinan University

Abstract: Recent Western studies show that compensation incen-tives do not necessarily alleviate the agency problem and sometimes the determination and implementation of compensation mechanisms will itself contribute to the agency problem. Specifically, managers can use their power to seek rent, especially affecting and even de-termining their own compensation, and ultimately reduce the firm’s performance. The Chinese institutional background, （including weak investor protection, insider control and socia... More
Keywords：

Managerial Power; Perquisite Consumption; Perfor-mance; Property Right;

  • Series：

    (J) Economics ＆ Management

  • Subject：

    Macro-economic Management and Sustainable Development; Enterprise Economy

  • Classification Code：

    F271;F224

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