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Large Shareholder’s Governance on Managerial Perk ConsumptionChinese Full Text

Luo Jinhui ,Wan Difang

Abstract: Based on 2005-2006 cross-section data of Chinese A-share listed companies,this paper tests the agency view of managerial perk consumption and then analyzes the governance effect of large shareholders and ownership structure’s characteristics on managerial over-investment behaviors. The empirical results show that:firstly,firm performance associates with the level of managerial perk consumption negatively,that is,the agency view is held. Secondly,there is a nonlinear "U" shape relationship betwee... More
  • Series:

    (J) Economics & Management

  • Subject:

    Macro-economic Management and Sustainable Development; Enterprise Economy

  • Classification Code:

    F276.6;F224

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